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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-2549 
______________ 
 
STEVEN R. GRABOFF, M.D., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS; 
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-05491) 
District Judge: Hon. Joel H. Slomsky 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 7, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 19, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
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 Dr. Steven R. Graboff appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his second 
lawsuit alleging that an article published by the American Association of Orthopaedic 
Surgeons and the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (collectively “AAOS”) 
tortiously placed him in a false light.  The District Court dismissed Graboff’s successive 
false light claim under the doctrine of res judicata.  We will affirm. 
I. 
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Graboff was retained as an expert witness in a medical 
malpractice case.  Graboff v. The Colleran Firm, No. 10-1710, 2013 WL 1286662 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 28, 2013).  On December 7, 2005, he submitted a draft expert report to The 
Colleran Firm, the law firm that had retained him.  Id. at *1.  The defendant in the 
malpractice case filed a grievance against Graboff with AAOS, alleging that Graboff had 
violated AAOS’s Standards of Professionalism on Orthopaedic Expert Witness 
Testimony.  Id.  AAOS suspended Graboff’s membership for two years and published an 
article describing Graboff’s suspension (the “Article”) in the September 2009 issue of 
AAOS Now, a periodical freely available on the Internet through AAOS’s website.  Id. at 
*2.  On April 16, 2010, Graboff filed a complaint against AAOS in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging, among other things, that 
AAOS had tortiously placed him in a false light through its publication of the Article 
(“2010 Complaint”).  Id.  On April 27, 2012, a jury found in Graboff’s favor, awarding 
him $140,000 in damages for past loss of earnings, $0 in damages for future loss of 
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earnings, and $56,000 in noneconomic damages.  This Court affirmed the order denying 
AAOS’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, holding that the jury’s findings established that AAOS was liable for false 
light as well as for defamation.  Graboff v. The Colleran Firm, No. 13-2229 (3d Cir. Feb. 
20, 2014). 
After the verdict, Graboff asked AAOS to remove the Article from its website.  
AAOS allegedly refused to do so.  As a result, on September 26, 2012, Graboff filed the 
complaint in the case now before us, alleging that the Article continued to place him in a 
false light, seeking an order directing AAOS to remove the Article from AAOS’s 
website, and requesting compensatory and punitive damages and costs.
1
  On October 22, 
2012, AAOS filed a motion to dismiss Graboff’s complaint under, among other things,2 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Graboff’s claims were barred under the doctrine of 
                                                 
1
 Count One alleges that the Article portrays Graboff in a false light.  The portion 
of the complaint labeled as Count Two sets forth remedies he seeks, but does not set forth 
a separate cause of action.  See Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 157 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(interpreting separate “count” in complaint as simply “seek[ing] declaratory and 
injunctive relief in addition to the relief requested in” other counts). 
2
 AAOS also sought to dismiss the complaint based upon a lack of personal 
jurisdiction and improper venue.  The District Court declined to reach those arguments 
because it dismissed the complaint on other grounds.  Although AAOS repeats its 
personal jurisdiction arguments on appeal, we also need not reach them because we will 
affirm the dismissal on res judicata grounds.  Because dismissal on res judicata grounds 
does not require us to reach the merits, see Comm’r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) 
(“If the doctrine of res judicata is properly applicable . . . , the case may be disposed of 
without reaching the merits of the controversy.”), we need not resolve the jurisdictional 
issue.  See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 
(2007) (holding that jurisdictional issues generally must be resolved before reaching the 
merits). 
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res judicata and that Graboff’s request for an order directing AAOS to remove the article 
from its website was precluded under Pennsylvania law.  On May 2, 2013, the District 
Court granted AAOS’s motion to dismiss on both grounds.  Graboff appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of 
AAOS’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary.  Gelman v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
III. 
 Here, the District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was barred 
by the judgment entered on the 2010 Complaint under the doctrine of res judicata.  The 
doctrine of res judicata “protect[s] litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical 
issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing 
needless litigation.”  Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).  The 
law governing whether a federal judgment in one case has preclusive effect depends upon 
the basis for the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction in that case.  Generally, “[f]or 
judgments [entered] in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion 
applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.”  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 
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891 n.4 (2008); see Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 
(2001) (explaining that “nationwide uniformity . . . is better served by having the same 
claim-preclusive rule (the state rule) apply whether the dismissal has been ordered by a 
state or a federal court,” unless “state [preclusion] law is incompatible with federal 
interests”); Houbigant, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 374 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In a 
diversity action, we apply the preclusion rules of the forum state, unless they are 
incompatible with federal interests.”). 
 Here, the District Court had diversity jurisdiction over the 2010 Complaint and the 
causes of action were based on Pennsylvania law.  Accordingly, Pennsylvania preclusion 
rules apply.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a]ny final, valid judgment on the merits by a 
court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their 
privies on the same cause of action,” Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 
(Pa. 1995), even if different or additional relief or grounds for relief are sought in the 
later case.  Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 653 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(“Res judicata may bar a second action based upon the same transaction even if 
additional grounds for relief are presented.” (citing Larsen v. Larsen, 141 A.2d 353, 354 
(Pa. 1958)).  For res judicata to apply, Pennsylvania courts require the two actions to 
share the following characteristics: “(1) the thing sued upon or for; (2) the cause of 
action; (3) the persons and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the parties to sue 
or be sued.”  Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. 1974)). 
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 Res judicata bars Graboff’s present suit.  First, in both cases, Graboff lodged tort 
claims based upon AAOS’s publication of the Article.  Second, each case included a 
cause of action for casting Graboff in a false light.  Third, Graboff and AAOS are parties 
in both cases.  Fourth, there is no dispute that Graboff has the capacity to sue and AAOS 
can be sued.  Fifth, final judgment was entered on the 2010 Complaint, finding AAOS 
liable and awarding Graboff damages.  The fact that Graboff’s second complaint 
requested injunctive relief in addition to damages does not change the fact that the second 
suit is barred by the first case.  See Dempsey, 653 A.2d at 682. 
 Graboff contends, however, that his successive false light claim is not barred 
because the Article has been “repeatedly republished” by virtue of its continued presence 
on AAOS’s website and “[e]ach republication of that story constitutes a separate count of 
false light invasion of privacy.”  Appellant Br. 21.  Pennsylvania’s “single publication 
rule” forecloses this argument. 
 Under Pennsylvania law, “it is the original printing of the defamatory material and 
not the circulation of it which results in a cause of action.”  Graham v. Today’s Spirit, 
468 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1983) (interpreting Uniform Single Publication Act);
3
 see 
                                                 
 
3
 The Pennsylvania Uniform Single Publication Act provides in pertinent part: 
(b) General rule.  No person shall have more than one cause of action for 
damages for . . . invasion of privacy, or any other tort founded upon any 
single publication . . . . 
 
(c) Bar by judgment.  A judgment . . . for or against the plaintiff upon the 
substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single 
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Andrews v. Time, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting the “statute 
replaced the common law rule which provided that each separate communication – i.e., 
each separate copy of an allegedly defaming magazine – gave rise to a separate cause of 
action”).  The posting of an article on the Internet is the act of publication.  Its continuous 
availability to be viewed does not constitute republication.
4
  If continuous availability 
constituted the act of republication, then “[a] publisher would remain subject to suit for 
statements made many years prior, and ultimately could be sued repeatedly for a single 
tortious act the prohibition of which was the genesis of the single publication rule.”  In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “Pennsylvania 
courts ha[d] not considered whether the single publication rule applies to Internet 
publication” but concluding that adding a link to or making a technical change without 
altering the substance of an article posted on the Internet is not republication). 
 Under Pennsylvania’s single publication rule, the Article’s continuous posting on 
the Internet does not constitute separate acts of republication.  Graboff had only one 
cause of action with respect to the initial publication of the Article that placed him in a 
false light.  Accordingly, because Graboff’s second false light claim is based on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
publication . . . shall bar any other action for damages by the same plaintiff 
against the same defendant founded upon the same publication . . . . 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8341. 
4
 Republication of defamatory material, for example in a new edition of a book or 
in an edited and reissued form, is “[a]n exception to the single publication rule . . . .”  In 
re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2012).  Such republication resets 
the statute of limitations and can support a cause of action.  Id. at 173-75. 
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publication of the Article that was the subject of the 2010 Complaint, and because the 
single, continuous publication of the Article does not give rise to separate claims, and 
because the single claim has been decided on the merits, the second complaint is barred 
under the doctrine of res judicata and dismissal was appropriate.
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                 
5
 The District Court also dismissed Graboff’s request for an injunction compelling 
AAOS to remove the Article from its website because he seeks a remedy not permitted 
under Pennsylvania law.  See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent “quite clearly reflects its continuing 
adherence to the adequate [legal] remedy rationale for denying injunctive relief” and 
stating the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be unlikely to permit injunctions even 
following “a jury determination of the libelous nature of specific statements”).  Because 
res judicata justifies dismissal of the complaint, we need not evaluate whether the remedy 
sought is available. 
